Questions: In response to this, Garcia might say, as he sometimes does, that it is enough for Stephen to be a racist if his dislike is "racially based," That is, if he dislikes Andre because of Andre's racial designation. On this view, in order for Stephen's dislike of Andre to be racist, Stephen need not dislike him because of any beliefs he (Stephen) holds about "races" in general or about black people in particular, provided he makes a racial distinction "in his heart." But is this correct? Let's suppose that Peter X, a white but problack radical, has contempt for Andre because Peter believes that no selfrespecting black man committed to the black freedom struggle would be involved romantically with a white woman. Peter's contempt is directed at Andre because of Andre's "race," but in being contemptuous of him for this reason Peter would be simply echoing the sentiment of many blacks who believe that the cause of black liberation requires observing the rule of racial endogamy. Peter's contempt for Andre may be unjustified, but surely it is not racist, despite its being "racially based." Thus, the fact that a vicious attitude has a "racial basis" is not sufficient to ground the charge of racism; the exact nature of the corresponding racial beliefs will also be relevant. (It is perhaps also worth pointing out that Garcia's talk of making distinctions "within one's heart" is quite misleading, for surely our ability to discriminate on "racial" grounds is a cognitive capacity; and not a purely volitional one,)

The passage presents a nuanced discussion on the nature of racism, particularly focusing on whether a dislike or contempt that is racially based is inherently racist. The argument revolves around the perspectives of Garcia and the hypothetical scenarios involving Stephen and Peter X.

1. Garcia's Perspective: Garcia suggests that a person's dislike can be considered racist if it is racially based, meaning that if Stephen dislikes Andre because of Andre's racial designation, it is sufficient to label Stephen's attitude as racist. This view implies that the mere presence of a racial distinction in one's feelings or attitudes is enough to categorize those feelings as racist, regardless of any broader beliefs about races.

2. Counterexample with Peter X: The passage challenges Garcia's perspective by introducing the case of Peter X, a white pro-black radical who holds contempt for Andre due to Andre's interracial relationship. Peter's contempt is racially based, as it stems from a belief that a black man should not be romantically involved with a white woman. However, this contempt is aligned with a belief held by some within the black community that supports racial endogamy for the sake of black liberation. The passage argues that while Peter's attitude may be unjustified, it is not necessarily racist, despite its racial basis. This suggests that the context and nature of the racial beliefs involved are crucial in determining whether an attitude is racist.

3. Cognitive vs. Volitional Distinctions: The passage also critiques Garcia's notion of making racial distinctions "within one's heart," arguing that the ability to discriminate on racial grounds is a cognitive capacity rather than purely volitional. This implies that racism involves more than just feelings; it involves cognitive processes and beliefs about race.

In summary, the passage argues that simply having a racially based attitude is not sufficient to label it as racist. The nature of the underlying racial beliefs and the context in which they are held play a significant role in determining whether an attitude is racist. This perspective encourages a more nuanced understanding of racism, considering both cognitive and contextual factors.