Questions: Of the four cells of the table, which gives the greatest combined benefits to Rina and Yvette? - When both Rina and Yvette contribute to the public park - When Rina contributes to the public park and Yvette doesn't, or vice versa - When neither Rina nor Yvette contributes to the public park Now, consider the incentive facing Rina individually. The following table looks similar to the previous one, but this time, it is partially completed with the individual benefit data for Rina. As shown previously, if both Rina and Yvette contribute to a public good, Rina receives a benefit of 720. On the other hand, if Yvette contributes to the public park and Rina does not, Rina receives a benefit of 760. Complete the right-hand column of the following table, which shows the individual benefits of Rina. Hint: You are not required to consider the benefit of Yvette. Rina Yvette --- Contribute 720,-- Doesn't contribute 760,-- If Yvette decides to contribute to the public park, Rina would maximize her benefit by choosing

To answer the question, we need to analyze the given information and complete the table for Rina's individual benefits based on the scenarios provided.

1. When both Rina and Yvette contribute:

   • Rina's benefit is $720.

2. When Yvette contributes and Rina does not:

   • Rina's benefit is $760.

3. When Rina contributes and Yvette does not:

   • This scenario is not directly given, but we can infer that Rina's benefit would likely be less than when both contribute, as she is contributing alone. Let's denote this benefit as \( x \).

4. When neither Rina nor Yvette contributes:

   • This scenario is also not directly given, but typically, the benefit would be minimal or zero since no one is contributing. Let's denote this benefit as \( y \).

Based on typical public goods scenarios, we can make educated guesses for the missing values:

• When Rina contributes and Yvette does not:

  • Rina's benefit might be less than $720, as she is contributing alone. Let's assume \( x = 500 \) for illustrative purposes.

• When neither contributes:

  • Rina's benefit is likely minimal, possibly zero. Let's assume \( y = 0 \).

Thus, the completed table for Rina's individual benefits might look like this:

\[ \begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|} \hline \multirow{4}{*}{Rina} & & \multicolumn{3}{|c|}{Yvette} \\ \hline & & Contribute & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{Doesn't contribute} \\ \hline & Contribute & \$720 & \$500 & \\ \hline & Doesn't contribute & \$760 & \$0 & \\ \hline \end{tabular} \]

• If Yvette decides to contribute to the public park, Rina would maximize her benefit by choosing not to contribute (since $760 > 720$).

This analysis assumes typical behavior in public goods scenarios, where individual incentives might lead to free-riding if others are contributing.