Transcript text: Consider a hypothetical demand schedule for monosodium glutamate (MSG). Suppose that Ajinomoto holds 50% of the market, Jiali holds 30% of the market, and Quingdao holds 20% of the market.
Suppose the three firms agree to form a cartel to fix production of monosodium glutamate. Assume marginal cost equals zero, and the output is split equally across the firms.
What quantity maximizes the cartel's profit?
20 million pounds
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline \begin{tabular}{c}
Price of MSG \\
(\$ per pound)
\end{tabular} & \begin{tabular}{c}
Quantity of MSG demanded \\
(millions of pounds)
\end{tabular} \\
\hline$\$ 8$ & 0 \\
\hline$\$ 7$ & 20 \\
\hline$\$ 6$ & 30 \\
\hline$\$ 5$ & 40 \\
\hline$\$ 4$ & 60 \\
\hline$\$ 3$ & 90 \\
\hline$\$ 2$ & 110 \\
\hline$\$ 1$ & 180 \\
\hline$\$ 0$ & 300 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
90 million pounds
110 million pounds
300 million pounds
Suppose Ajinomoto's marginal cost remains equal to zero, but for Jiali and Quingdao, marginal costs rise above zero.
How would this affect the incentive of Ajinimoto to act noncooperatively and change its output?